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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALICE B. RING,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.
12961

VS.

WALLACE H. RING,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Honorable Merrill
C. Faux modifying a decree of divorce with regard to alimony
and child custody.

DISPOSITION BELOW
The trial court modified the decree ( 1) to eliminate any
obligation to pay alimony and ( 2) to so expand the Respondent's "visitation rights" that he in fact has custody of the
parties' three children during one or two months per year.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the modification order primarily as it relates to custody and secondarily as it relates to
elimination of alimony.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Complaint in the original divorce action was filed in
April of 1967 (R-1). In December of that year, a counterclaim
was filed ( R-10) . The action was never tried; a decree based
on stipulation was entered on September 19, 1968 ( R-22).
Throughout the marriage of the parties', Appellant produced income for the family by practicing her profession on a
more or less part-time basis (R-131 et seq). She received as
much as $915.00 per month for that activity (R-132). At the
time the decree was entered, she was making $6,996.68 per year
(Exhibit 2D) . She was at all times licensed to practice medicine and surgery.
After the decree, Appellant prepared to practice full-time.
She selected a specialty, public health, which would permit regular hours to be devoted to her children (R-139). To this end,
she completed graduate training at the University of California
( R-90), and became Assistant Regional Director for Health
Manpower in the P.H.S. offices in San Francisco (R-91). This
is a civil service position for which the salary is $25,620.00 per
year.
Although she has increased her dollar income by some
$19,000.00 per year since the decree was entered, Appellant
incurs expenses for transportation to and from her place of
work, for parking, for insurance, for entertainment, for out of
state travel and for the maintenance of her home, all of which
would be unnecessary if she chose not to be productive. These
are estimated to consume about $200.00 per month (R-140 et
seq). The really major expense items, however, are taxes, estimated at $7 ,200.00 per year ( R-140) and child care, presumably about $3,100.00 per year (Exhibit 4-P).
2

The trial court refused to hear testimony with regard to
comparative costs of living as between Salt Lake and San Francisco ( R-141 ) . The court further refused to receive evidence
relating to the sources of the family income during the decade
of the parties' marriage ( R-15 2 statement of court with regard
to Exhibit 3-P, offered and refused), or the degree to which the
parties were influenced by tax considerations in dividing the
support payments to which they stipulated (and which were
incorporated in the original decree) as between spousal and
child support ( R-143).
During the period since the divorce, Respondent's annual
dollar income has increased from $29 ,500.00 ( R-108), to
something in excess of $40,000.00, of which $35,000.00 is paid
in taxable salary and bonuses (R-106) and "more than"
$5,000.00 is paid in non-taxed contributions to a profit sharing
plan and insurance benefits ( R-116) .
With regard to Respondent's exercise of his visitation
rights during the years after the divorce when the children were
in Salt Lake, the evidence is that he saw the children "sporadically" (R-144) and would stay away from them "for long
periods of time - a month or more" (R-145). While Appellant was completing P.H.S. training at Berkeley and the children were with her, Respondent made little effort to communicate with them. One summer, he asked the children if they
would like to take a river trip with him, but he refused to pay
their transportation to and from Salt Lake ( R-119, 146) .
In any event, it is clear that Appellant has been most considerate and cooperative in making the children available to
their father. Four years elapsed between the filing of the com-
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plaint and the filing of the petition to modify the decree. During those important, formative years of the children's lives
Respondent showed little disposition to enjoy their company. '
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING
THE CUSTODY PROVISIONS OF THE DECREE
ON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT
At the time of the decree, the parties stipulated that Ap·
pellant should have custody of the children subject to "reason·
able visitation rights." Respondent's petition for modification
sought, and the court granted, a basic alteration of the custody
situation on no evidence except that Appellant had found it
necessary or expedient to take employment and residence in
California.
We are aware that Respondent and the trial court looked
upon the order that the children spend two months per year in
their father's home as a mere clarification of "reasonable visita·
tion rights." We submit, however, that the placement of these
children for two months each year in a different home, in a
different city under the supervision of a person whose attitudes
and concepts of right conduct are at strong variance from Ap·
pellant's is a change in their custody. The person who has the
custodial responsibility makes decisions and establishes patterns
with regard to such things as church attendance, personal hy·
giene, and entertainment, and imposes an overall discipline.
A parent with mere visitation rights can exercise no such funda·
mental influence.
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The parties agreed, and the court concurred in 1968, that
Appellant should have the sole and exclusive custody of these
children and set the tone of their upbringing. Appellant has
taken special pains to realize her professional potential in a
manner which permits her to be home most of the time when
the children are home. There is not a word in the record to
suggest that she has failed in any respect to give the children
guidance and wholesome example.
In the six years between Respondent's 1966 departure
from the home of the parties' and his filing of the petition for
modification in 1972, Respondent demonstrated little desire
for the companionship of his children. He would leave them
alone for weeks at a time when he had easy access to them.
When they lived in California, he chose to travel extensively in
Europe and Mexico in preference to visiting them. He cancelled
a proposed river trip with the children because he couldn't
afford to pay the costs of their transportation to and from Salt
Lake
The record simply doesn't reveal a change in circumstances
which justifies the court in taking the children from their
mother for months each year. If there was reason for divided
custody in 1968, Respondent should have insisted upon it or
submitted the matter to the court. Having stipulated that the
circumstances were such that Appellant should have full custody, Respondent should be required to show some failure on
Appellant's part to meet the demands of custody if he now feels
constrained to assume a true parental role.
Obviously, when a marriage ends and children are involved, sympathy can be engendered for both parents in their endeavors to maintain relationships with their children. There

are many arguments that can be made for a split custody ar.
rangement. Children may require both masculine and feminine
influences. A father may need and deserve the companionship
and affection of his children as much as a mother. All these
are arguments which should be made at the time of the divorce
proceedings. Once the decree has been entered, the same basic
judicial philosophy applies to custody provisions as to property
settlement and support provisions; the parties should be able
to rely on the finality of the decree.
The standard texts treat the subject of custody at great
length, and little purpose would be served by quoting at length
from them. We feel, however, that the following excerpts
from the American Jurisprudence Treatise on Divorce and Separation are particularly relevant.
"The doctrine of res judicata applies to that part
of the divorce decree which grants custody, and the
court cannot re-examine the facts formerly adjudicated
and make a different order thereon. It is accordingly
stated broadly that there must be a substantial change
of circumstances presenting a new case before the court
may make a substantial change in the custody order.
The ordinary doctrine of res judicata contemplates
that an adjudication operates not only as to matters
actually litigated and decided but also as to matters
which could have been but were not litigated, so long
as the parties and the cause of action are the same."
( 24 Am Jur 2nd 928)
"A court which is charged with the duty of award·
ing the custody of a minor child has the power to divide
or alternate the custody of a child between the parents
or other persons, as by awarding custody to one person
for 6 months or more and then to another person for
6 months or less, and to repeat the shifting of custody
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each year. Nevertheless, the courts frequently criticize
th~ practice of dividing or alternating the custody of
children for equal periods of time, and have said that
divided custody should be avoided whenever it is reasonably possible to do so, and that divided custody will
not be approved except under very exceptional circumstances. Divided custody is not considered to be in the
best interests of a child; if a child is shifted from home
to home and from city to city it will have no real home
and no permanent environment and associations." ( 24
Am Jur 2d 907)

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CONTROLLING WEIGHT TO APPELLANT'S INCOME IN FIXING THE LEVEL OF ALIMONY
AND IN EXCLUDING ALL TESTIMONY AS TO
OTHER FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROPRIETY AND ADEQUACY OF ALIMONY.
The evidence that Appellant has increased h~ annual
dollar income since the date of the decree is, of course, uncontrovertible. The court refused to hear any testimony as to the
basis on which the spousal and child support levels of the 1968
stipulation were fixed, and ruled, in effect, that a wife is entitled to no continuing support from her husband if, after their
divorce, she begins producing income sufficient for her reasonable needs.
In essence, the trial court adopted the concept that the one
factor which can even be considered in determining whether a
husband must contribute to his wife's support after divorce is

her need of that support.
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The attitude of the trial court in this regard is at serious
variance with that of this court as expressed periodically over
the years. Perhaps the most recent occassion for discussing the
factors which should control in fixing alimony (where the
parties cannot agree and that responsibility is imposed on the
trial judge) was Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U2d 79, 296 P2d 977.
An apt quote from that decision is found at page 83 of the Utah
Reporter:
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic
resources so that the parties can reconstruct their lives
on a happy and useful basis. In doing so it is necessary
for the court to consider, in addition to the relative guilt
or innocence of the parties, an appraisal of all of the
attendant facts and circumstances: the duration of the
marriage; the ages of the parties; their social positions
and standards of living; their health; considerations
relative to children; the money and property they
possess and how it was acquired; their capabilities and
training and their present and potential incomes."
The same point of view is expressed in Pinion v. Pinion, 92 U
255, 67 P2d 265, and McDonald v. McDonald, 120 U 573,
236 P2d 1066.
It is noteworthy that the quoted language from Wilson
in no sense ties the support obligation to the income of the
wife at the time the decree is entered. The incomes of the parties
is the last factor to be mentioned, and then it is emphasized that
not just the "present" income but the "potential" income should
be considered. It is not the income of the wife but her capacity

to produce income which determines her need of support.
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In the instant case, the parties were represented by counsel
when they executed their stipulation, and it must be assumed
that they reached their decision about the appropriate family
support obligation to be assumed by Respondent by evaluating
the factors identified as relevant by this court.
With reference to those factors, the court in 1968 found
that Respondent used abusive language to Appellant, disclaimed
affection for her, threatened to leave her and in fact left the
home of the partes' on August 1, 1966. There is otherwise
nothing in the record to indicate where the fault for the marriage disintegration lies.
We know that the marriage lasted for more than a decade,
that three children were born, that the parties are old enough
to have been medical students in 1956, and that Appellant was
a source of significant income for the family throughout the
marriage. All these are circumstances which favor the imposition of alimony obligation.
With regard to Appellant's actual and potential income
at the time of divorce, the record reveals her actual income, and,
if the court resorts to data which is well within the scope of
Judicial notice, her potential income can be determined with
reasonable accuracy. The 1971 Edition of the U.S. Department
of Commerce's Statistical Abstract of the United States reports
the median annual income of general practitioners in the United
States (after tax-deductible professional expenses) to have been
$31,370.00 in 1967, rising to $32,990.00 in 1968. Since Appellant was properly categorized as a general practitioner in
1967 and had maintained her skills during a decade of at least
part-time practice, her potential income was somewhere near
the median at the time of the divorce.
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While the court would hear no testimony on how the
parties evaluated Appellant's income potential when they made
their stipulation, the record is not entirely devoid of evidence
on this sub jeer. In his counterclaim ( R-10-12 ) , paragraph 5,
Respondent represents to the court that Appellant "is a physician and surgeon and is capable of earning sufficient income
to support herself." This representation was true; subsequent
history has proved it, and the parties were perfectly aware of it
when they made their stipulation. If the record supports any
presumption, it is the presumption that the parties agreed Respondent should pay $800.00 per month in family support
even though Apellant could and would produce mcome near
the average of general practitioners.
Another factor which this court considers significant with
regard to alimony is how the parties acquired their marital
estate and achieved their financial position. Here again, the
trial court refused to receive evidence. Appellant offered Exhibit
3D, however, which reveals, even without supporting testimony,
that Respondent achieved his stature in the medical community
and qualified to command the more than $40,000.00 annual
income he now enjoys because Appellant supported the family
whenever Respondent wanted to take the time for residency or
other training necessary for certification in his specialty. The
only real assets the parties owned at the time of their separation
were their medical credentials, and Respondent's education was
basically purchased by Appellant. The parties stipulated and
the court concurred, in 1968, that Appellant should share the
fruits of Respondent's exalted medical status. The mere fact
that she began to produce income (as the parties anticipated)
after the divorce is hardly a valid reason for taking from her
an asset for which she paid. Clearly, a wife's income from an·
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ticipated employment is not a proper basis for reduction of
alimony. This court so held in Allen v. Allen, 25 U2d 87, 475
P2d 1021.
It is significant, we submit, that it was only after Respondent had completed his residency and begun to enjoy a specialist's
income that he left Appellant. The equities do not favor elimination of alimony in the circumstances of this case.

All the above are facts which were clearly known and
contemplated by the parties when they stipulated for divorce.
They are obvious facts even if no recital of them appears in the
formal stipulation. This court has recently spoken on the duty
of the trial court in this situation. In Felt v Felt, 493 P2d 620,
27 U2d 103, the court said:
"In doing so, we affirm our previous pronouncements that a divorce decree containing awards for support based on either expressed or assumed facts contemplated by the parties or the court or both, should
not be modified when the contemplated facts are obvious or agreed to by the parties and in turn incorporated in the decree, in which event the continuous jurisdiction of the court to modify should not be used to
thwart the expressed or obvious intentions of the parties
and/ or the court ... "
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT AN
INCREASE IN APPELLANT'S EARNED INCOME WAS A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE
COMPELLING ALIMONY ELIMINATION
EVEN IF THE STIPULATION DID NOT CONTEMPLATE SUCH INCREASE
The evidence in this case is that Appellant's dollar income
has increased, since the date of the decree, by some $19,000.00
11

per year. Of that, however, she must pay approximately $13,000.00 in taxes, costs directly attributable to her employment
status, and costs of providing adequate supervision for the
children while she is away. Her real income has increased by
an amount which merely permits her family of four to live
nicely but not luxuriously so long as Respondent contributes
as he agreed.
The trial court would not permit testimony about the
higher costs of San Francisco living and ruled that, if Appellant
chose to accept California employment, her purchasing power
must nevertheless be evaluated by Utah standards for purposes
of determining whether there has been a change in financial
circumstancs. We submit that the trial court's position in this
regard is patently illogical and unrealistic.
We do not deny, however, that Appellant's financial
position has improved by reason of her employment. She could
undoubtedly cope if she received no support from Respondent.
The question is not whether she could cope but whether she
should be required to.
We have already commented upon the circumstances
which, in equity, entitle Appellant to share the fruits of Re·
spondent's elevated earnings as a specialist. It is of passing
interest that his annual earnings, since the divorce, have increased by some $11,000.00, half again as much as he was
required to pay in alimony. He has assumed no new financial
responsibilities.
Our major point is that (even where the parties have not
stipulated to alimony anticipating the wife's return to employ·
ment) it is not in the interest of society that a wife should
be penalized for being industrious once the level of suppart
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to which she is entitled from her husband is established by a
divorce decree.
We have been unable, in our research, to discover a single
case where an alimony award has been reduced because the wife
began earning money except where it has been apparent that
the payment of the originally decreed alimony worked a serious
hardship on the husband. Where it is obvious that the original
alimony was set at a level which reduced the husband to a
sub-marginal living standard, but no other source of support
for the wife was available, the courts have granted the husband
some relief when the wife has begun to earn.
In Christensen v. Christensen, 294 NW 154, 295 Mich.
203, the trial court suspended alimony payments where the
husband was making $1,800.00 per year and, after the divorce,
the wife begain making $2,200.00 per year. The Michigan
Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the alimony, saying:
"Plaintiff's self-efforts do not in any degree afford
release of defendant."
The Michigan court reaffirmed that position in Harter v.
Harter, 11NW2d880.

In Brody v. Brody, 252 NY Supp 2d 1008 ( 1964), the
New York court made this statement on the subject:
"A wife, separated by decree from her husband,
should be encouraged to devote her energies in an effort
to make herself economically useful. Her right to support under the decree at the hands of her husband
should not be limited merely because, in an effort to
promote self-respect and to acquire a measure of _independence and future security, she seeks to keep mtact
her capital assets and she devotes herself to some employment or occupation resulting in earnings, small or
large."
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This subject is annotated in 18 ALR 2d. A relevant quote
from page 62 of the annotation, supported by a dozen cited
cases is this:
"The mere fact that the wife has secured employ.
ment or that her income has increased since the entry
of the decree for alimony or maintenance does not
automatically require a reduction in or termination of
payments, since the circumstances may be such that it
will be just to permit the wife to receive the alimony or
maintenance in addition to her income from personal
services."

In the instant case, there is special cogency to the argument that a wife should not be discouraged from becoming
economically productive after divorce. Appellant's skills are
in tragically short supply in our society. The failure of
America's medical schools to keep pace with the desperate need
(let alone the demand) for medical services is a national scandal. Appellant is employed in a program designed to distribute
medical services among the disadvantaged.
Obviously, this is not a usual case, but it points up the
shortsightedness of any judicial policy which removes the incentive for a wife to become productive. It is neither natural
or necessary that a woman stagnate after a divorce in order to
enjoy the right of support which a court has decreed she
deserves,
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN MODIFYING A DECREE BASED UPON
STIPULATION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
SHOWING OF HARDSHIP
There is, of course, an impressive support for the propo·
sition that a court may, where it appears that changes in the
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circumstances of the parties since a decree of divorce justify it,
modify the decree as it relates to alimony, support, and custody.
This court has, however, emphasized that a divorce decree is a
final judgment and is not lightly to be altered. The trial court
must be convinced that considerations of equity and justice
compel that the obligations of the parties be modified.
A recent expression on the subject is found in Sorenson
v. Sorenson, 20 U2d 360, 438 P2d 180. The court then said:
"The rules governing modification of the alimony
portion of a divorce decree grant the trial court the
advantage of some discretion, since the parties are
usually before the court and a sounder appraisal of the
situation can be made. Generally, the court is required
to give such a decree the final status accorded to any
civil judgment and to apply the doctrine of res judicata
thereto. The parties should be entitled to rely on the
finality of the alimony award in determining the right
to receive and the duty to pay. Our statute permits subsequent changes which are reasonable and proper. This
has been construed to empower the court to make a
modification where there has been a substantial change
in the material circumstances of either one or both of
the parties since the decree was entered. An application
for a modification should be subjected to thorough
scrutiny by the court. There are many factors that can
have a bearing on the resolution of the question."
(Our emphasis)
However reluctant the court should be to disturb the dedecree where it is based upon evidence received by the court and
repre~ents the court's judgment of what the obligations of the
parties should be, that reluctance should be strongly fortified
where the decree is based on an agreement between the parties
covering property settlement as well as child and spousal support. There is support in the cases for the proposition that a
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decree cannot be modified without the consent of the parties
where it is based on a stipulation covering all aspects of property and income division. The editors of American Jurisprudence (24 Am Jur 2d 789, Divorce Section 670) say this on
the Stibject:
"A contract of property settlement which also
provides for alimony, if approved by the decree of the
divorce court, becomes forever binding upon the parties,
and neither the contract nor the decree adopting it may
be revoked or modified without the consent of the
parties."
The concept that a court should be particularly slow to
modify a decree based on stipulation was recognized by this
court in Bott v. Bott, 20 U2d 329, 437 P2d 684. In that case,
the court commented on the basis for the trial court's retention
of jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree. "Especially should
this be true" (i.e., that the court retains jurisdiction), said
Justice Ellett, "when the parties voluntarily litigate a matter
over which the court has jurisdiction."
In the instant case, the parties did not voluntarily litigate

their cause, they negotiated a settlement agreement which the
court adopted as its decree.

CONCLUSION
The trial court has completely reformed the parties' agreement and the decree which issued from it. The court has eliminated alimony and split custody on no evidence of wrong doing
on Appellant's part whatsoever.
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Because you dared to restructure your life and put your
talent and education to use, said the court to Appellant, and
because you have assumed the professional role which best
permits you to supervise your children adequately, the court
is going to penalize you by taking away all support and even
taking your children from you for one-sixth of each year.
The approach of the trial court is totally out of harmony
with the views of this court. The court's refusal to hear evidence on factors which should be of controlling influence was
error. The order modifying the decree should be annulled.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK J. ALLEN
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
3 51 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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